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West German Elites: 
Cartel of Anxiety, Power Elite, 
or Responsive Representatives? 
Ursula HoJfmann-Lange 
The character of its elites is a crucial part of a society's structure. 
Many social theories ascribe a specific and important role to elites, 
particularly in terms of the functioning of liberal and democratic in-
stitutions (Field and Higley, 1980).1 It is therefore not surprising that 
German elites have become a favored subject of social science analyses 
searching for clues that would further our understanding of Germany's 
uneven path toward democracy. More studies have been devoted to 
German elites than to those of other societies. Over the last twenty-
five years, the small number of historical studies on German elites has 
been considerably enlarged by new historical-sociological analyses (Zapf, 
1965; Nagle, 1977; Fischer, 1979; Baum, 1981; Herf, 1984; Best, 1988). 
Moreover, several comprehensive surveys of West German elites after 
1945 provide a wealth of empirical material unparalleled in other 
nations (Deutsch and Edinger, 1959; Deutsch et al., 1967; Wildenmann, 
1968; von Beyme, 1971; Herzog, 1975; Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980; 
Wildenmann et al., 1982). 
The abundance of material on (West) German elites invites attempts 
to trace changes in the elites over the last hundred years. Thus far, 
however, Ralf Dahrendorf has been the only scholar to attempt a 
comprehensive analysis of the historical role of German elites. He 
devoted a full five chapters of his book Society and Democracy in 
Germany (1967) to a discussion of the special character of German 
A German version of this artiele was fiest published in Heinrich Best (ed.), 1989. Politik 
und Milieu, pp. 238-261. SI. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag. 
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elites and their contribution to the historical failure of democracy in 
Germany. His analysis covers the period from 1871 to 1959. Systematic 
empirical data were but one source of evidence used by Dahrendorf, a 
source that he complemented with other material and general elite 
theoretical considerations. This is the reason why his analysis has long 
been considered the authoritative statement on the character of German 
elites. 
However, after more than twenty years since the first German edition 
of Dahrendorf's book appeared, it seems time to review his theses. 
This is all the more necessary because he argued that there was a 
notable persistence of traditional structures in West Germany. Given 
the fact that his evidence on West German elites is from the late 1950s, 
when the Federal Republic had existed for only ten years, we should 
ask which of his conclusions still hold true and which were time-bound 
and must be modified. Nevertheless, Dahrendorf's analysis provides an 
excellent starting point for a study of West German elites in the 1980s. 
The following review will both update some of the results on which 
Dahrendorf's analysis was based and provide a critique of some of his 
theoretical assumptions that do not hold up to either more recent 
empirical evidence or theoretical developments. 
In order to discuss the relationship between the character of German 
elites and democratic stability in more detail, we need a theoretical as 
weil as an operational definition of who belongs to the elites. There is 
considerable consensus in the social sciences for defining elites as 
persons with power to influence strategic decisions in a society on a 
regular basis (Hoffmann-Lange, 1989; Higley et al., 1979: 3; Scheuch, 
1973: 1028). Because modern societies are complex and include a !arge 
number of important organizations, it is necessary to consider in elite 
studies the leaders of a broad variety of sectors and organizations. It 
would be insufficient to include politicalleaders as defined in a narrow 
sense only, i.e., leading politicians. Dahrendorf offers a broad definition 
of national elites. He defines them as "persons in positions where they 
can make laws" (1967: 208) and operationalizes this by including in 
his analysis not only politicians but also administrative and judicial 
elites, as well as pressure group and media elites. 
The data on which the following analysis is based are taken from a 
comprehensive elite survey carried out in 1981,2 The study began by 
defining 3,580 top leadership positions in a variety of political, eco-
nomic, and social sectors. Within each sector, the most important 
organizations were included, and within each organization, the incum-
bents of the highest positions were asked for a personal interview. Table 
4.1 includes the number of positions and respondents in each sector. 
The number of position-holders is somewhat smaller than the number 
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TABLE 4.1 Sector Composition and Response Rates In the West German Elite Study, 
1981 
PosItIon- Response 
Positions holders Respondents Rate 
SectOf n % n % n % % 
Polltles 539 15.1 452 14.3 274 15.7 60.6 
Clvll service 479 13.4 471 14.9 296 17.0 62.8 
Business 837 23.4 688 21.7 285 16.3 41.4 
Business assoclatlons 394 11.0 296 9.4 174 10.0 58.8 
Trade unions 155 4.3 155 4.9 87 5.0 56.1 
Mass medla 378 10.5 354 11.2 222 12.7 62.7 
Academle 209 5.6 179 5.7 130 7.5 72.6 
Military 172 4.8 172 5.4 43 2.5 25.0 
Cultural 168 5.3 180 5.7 104 6.0 57.8 
Othero 231 8.5 218 8.9 129 7.4 59.2 
Total 3,580 100.1 3,185 100.1 1,744 100.1 55.1 
'Professlonal assoclatlons; consumers' assoclatlons; the judleiary; ehurehes; mayors 
and administrative heads 01 the 15 blggest eitles; addltionally, a number of persons 
who lost thelr elite positions during the fieldwork stage. 
of positions because some individuals held several elite positions at the 
same time. 
Dahrendorf's Theory of Elites 
The elite concept plays an important role in the context of two 
different theoretical paradigms, both of which focus on fundamental 
problems of societal integration and democracy: the radical democratic 
paradigm and the pluralist paradigm. Proponents of the radical dem-
ocratic paradigm conceive of societies as divided along a line that 
separates elites from nonelites. According to this paradigm, the basic 
problem of societal integration lies in the tendency of elites to develop 
interests of their own and to escape popular contro!. That means that 
this paradigm assumes a low degree of vertical integration in society. 
Marxist class theory as weH as power elite theories are examples of 
this paradigm (MilIs, 1956; Domhoff, 1983; Miliband, 1969). 
Proponents of the pluralist paradigm, on the other hand, do not 
believe vertical integration to be a major problem. Although they do 
not deny that power differentials exist in modern societies, they see 
these societies as stratified, rather than split into two classes separated 
by a sharp divide. In their view, a much more significant characteristic 
of modern societies is their high degree of differentiation, i.e., the 
existence of a large number of more or less autonomous organizations. 
In such a paradigm, social differentiation has created novel problems 
of horizontal integration because the number of groups is by definition 
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large. Pluralists have therefore raised the question of how elite integra-
tion takes place or how it is even possible in such societies (DahI, 
1958; Keller, 1963). 
Modern organizations set their own rules for personnel recruitment 
and promotion. This process results in the creation of national elites 
that are "abstract" in the sense that the incumbents of leadership 
positions in the various organizations are elites in the first instance by 
virtue of their power in these organizations but often lack commonality 
beyond that. That is, they do not automaticaUy form a social group. It 
, is obvious that a lack of elite integration creates potential problems for 
I the functioning of modern societies. After an, the elites of different , organizations must be able to cooperate with one another to arrive at 
i collective decisions for the community as a whole. Moreover, any society 
needs at least some coordination of decisionmaking that bridges the 
conflicts of interest between the different powerful organizations in 
society. 
I have started with these two paradigms because Dahrendorf's elite 
theory tries to integrate the two. For Dahrendorf, neither vertical nor 
horizontal integration can be taken for granted, and both are needed 
for a liberal and democratic society. This implies that a liberal demo-
cratic elite possesses two characteristics: (I) It is characterized by a 
high degree of social cohesion, and (2) it is politically multiform, i.e., 
it reßects the "color and diversity of social interests." (1967: 29, 219-
220) 
Dahrendorf's theory involves a typology of elites derived from a 
cross-tabulation of two factors: the social type of an elite, which may 
be established or abstract, and the political outlook of an elite, which 
may be uniform or multiform (1967: 220): 
Political Outlook3 
Social Type Uniform Multiform 
Established Authoritarian elite Liberal elite 
Abstract Totalitarian elite '! 
Based on this typology, Dahrendorf analyzed the historical devel-
opment of German elites (1967: ch. 14). Presenting an impressive array 
of evidence drawn from a broad variety of sources, he concluded that 
Imperial Germany had an authoritarian elite. This elite was dominated 
by the Prussian nobility, and its modern elements, the business elites, 
did not play a significant political role. With the transition to the 
Weimar Republic, new political groups came to power. This created a 
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more heterogeneous national elite that was multiform in its outlooks 
but remained abstract beeause its members lacked social eohesion, 
thereby ereating problems of governanee. This vaeuum at the top was 
eventually filled by the totalitarian Nazi elite. Most of Dahrendorf's 
analysis deals with the eharaeter of the West German elite. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this ehapter to diseuss Dahrendorf's historical 
analysis, his conclusions regarding West German elites will be analyzed 
in more detail, starting with the first theoretieal question raised above: 
the question of the vertical integration of West German society. 
The Sodal Background oe West German Elites 
Radieal social scientists tend to devote mueh attention to the degree 
of openness of elite recruitment. This is normally measured by com-
paring the demographie eharacteristies of elites to those of a cross 
section of the population, Le., by studying the social representativeness 
of the elites. If they are predominantly recruited from a narrow social 
stratum (mostly from the upper or upper middle class), this is widely 
interpreted as showing that individuals from lower-class backgrounds 
are deliberately excluded from the power positions in a soeiety. 
All available empirieal evidence indicates that in virtually all soci-
eties elites are disproportionately reeruited from privileged social back-
grounds (Putnam, 1976: eh. 2). Table 4.2 shows that this is also true 
for West German elites with respeet to four faetors: gender, social class 
origin, religious denomination, and edueation. The table includes two 
different referenee groups: the working population over 40 years of age 
and the more inelusive group of all West German adults.4 The reason 
for ineluding both reference groups is that praetieally all elites belong 
to the first subgroup, whieh itself is not representative of the population 
at large beeause it excludes a eonsiderable part of the West German 
adult population: students, housewives, the unemployed, and the retired. 
A eomparison of the working population over 40 years of age to the 
universe of all adults thus already explains a good deal, especially about 
the underrepresentation of females within the elite population. 
Dahrendorf, a long-time advocate of equality of opportunities, ex-
plicitly eritieized the narrow social basis from whieh the West German 
elites-with the exception of the politicians-have traditionally been 
drawn (1967: 238-250). However, this has ehanged considerably in 
recent years. Although West Gennan elites still come disproportionately 
from the upper middle class, the percentage of elites from blue-collar 
families rose to 13 percent by 1981, with another 13 percent eoming 
from lower white-collar families (see Table 4.2). 
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TA8LE 4.2 Demographie Characleristles 01 Elites and Ihe General Population (column 
percentages. mlssing values exeluded) 
Total 
Work Force Population. 
40 Yeers of 18 Yeers of 
Elltes Age and Over Aga anti Ovar 
Total n 1.744 3.815 18.984 
Gender 
Male 97.2 76.6 45.1 
Female 2.8 23.4 54.9 
Soclal elass origin 
1.6 Lerge employer" 8.6 1.8 
Small employer'> 11.1 11.1 9.6 
Self-employed. no 
14.4 employees 8.5 16.6 
Higher whlte-eollar 45.1 10.8 11.8 
Lower whlte-eollar 13.4 15.9 16.8 
Higher blue-collar 5.2 7.8 7.4 
Lower blue-eollar 8.2 36.2 38.1 
Religion 
51.3 Protestant 52.3 52.1 
Roman Catholle 29.9 39.9 41.5 
None 17.7 8.0 7.2 
Educatlon 
Prlmary (9 years or less) 5.1 65.4 66.6 
Secondary (10 years) 9.8 23.7 24.2 
High school graduation 
9.2 (13 years) 85.1 10.9 
·10 or more employees. 
"2-9 employees. 
&Jurees: Figures lor Ihe eilles are Irom Rudol! Wlldermailn et al.. FOhrungsschlcht In 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1981 (Mannhelm: Unlversltllt Mannhelm. 1982); data 
lor the general population are from author"s secondary analyses of a pooIed data-set 
of several representatlve surveys carrled out between 1976 and 1979 by ZUMA (Zentrum 
fOr Umfragen. Methoden. and Analysen). Mannhelm. 
Before we can draw any conclusions from these data concerning the 
openness of elite recruitment in West Germany, however, we must 
provide at least a tentative answer to one fundamental normative 
question involved: With respect to what factors do we expect elites to 
be representative? Although the underrepresentation of persons from 
working-class backgrounds has usually been considered as problematic 
because it indicates unequal opportunities for upward sodal mobility, 
most observers would probably not blame the elites for overwhelmingly 
holding university degrees. However, educational opportunities are to 
a considerable degree determined by social class origin. Children from 
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TABLE 4.3 Camparlson of Soelal Clas8 Orlgln of Elftes and the General Population 
In West Germalny and In the Unlted States (eolumn pereentages, mlsslng values excluded) 
West Germany< Unlted States" 
Population EI/res Population EI/tes 
Large employers 1.8 8.6 1.6 21.3 
Small employera and 
self-employedc 27.7 19.6 10.1 27.3 
Wh/te-co/far and 
btue-collar wlth 
supervlsory 
functlon<' 18.4 50.3 37.4 35.4 
Lower white-collar 
and lower 
blue-collar" 52.1 21.6 49.2 16.0 
"PopUlation date for work force, 40 years of age and over. Souree: Flgures for the 
e/1teS are trom Rudolt WIldenmann et al., Fllhrungssehicht In der Bundesrepublik Deutseh-
land 1981 (Mannhelm: UnlversltAt Mannhelm, 1982); date tor the general population 
are trom author's secondary analyses of a pooled date-set ot saveral representatlve 
surveys carrIed out between 1976 and 1979 by ZUMA (Zentrum tor Umfragen, Methoden, 
und Analysen), Mannhelm. 
·Soures: Gwen Moore and Rlchard D. Alba, "Class and Prestige Orlgins in the American 
Elite," In Peter V. Marsden and Nan Un (eds.), Soc/al Structurs and Network Analysis 
(Beverly Hili., Calltomla: Sage, 1982), pp. 39-60. 
CEmployers and self-employed wlth up to 10 employees. 
dFourth and slxth categorles under "Social class orlgln" In Table 4.2. 
"Flfth and seventh categones under "Socla! class ongln" in Table 4.2. 
higher-class backgrounds have a disproportionate chance to receive a 
higher education. In effect, educational status is largely inherited. 
If we want to find out whether working-c1ass background as such is 
a disadvantage for a professional or political career, therefore, we must 
control statistically for this relationship between c1ass background and 
education. Such a control shows that in West Germany social c1ass 
background has no direct effect on the ascent into the elites. Among 
all well-educated West Gerrnans, the share of persons from warking-
c1ass backgrounds is not higher or lower than among the elites. It can 
thus be concluded that the underrepresentation of persons from working-
c1ass backgrounds arnong the elites is alrnost entirely due to limited 
educational opportunities, not to any systernatic discrimination beyond 
that. Although there are no systernatic studies comparing the oppor-
tunities for social mobility in West Gerrnany to those in other Western 
democracies, the elite data in Table 4.3 show that West Gerrnan elites 
are, if anything, certainly not less representative regarding their c1ass 
backgrounds than are their U.S. counterparts. In comparison to other 
countries, another result is more rernarkable. This is that 37.S percent 
of the West German elites' fathers were employed in the civil service. 
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Even though it is safe to ass urne that the German eivil service has 
changed a lot and should not be considered solely as a haven of 
conservatism, S it does seem to nurture elite career aspirations more 
than other soeial background environments. 
Although educational opportunities are sulficient to explain the un-
derrepresentation in the elite of persons from working-class back-
grounds, they are not sulfieient to explain the underrepresentation of 
women and Catholics. Neither group differs much from the national 
average in terms of educational credentials. Other factors need to be 
taken into account. However, these causes cannot be adequately studied 
by comparing elites to the general public. Instead, only comprehensive 
studies of social mobility could answer that question because the sociaI 
composition of the elite is the result of soeial mobility processes that 
may have Iittle to do with the elite role as such. 
Representation in West Germany 
The lack of socioeconomic representativeness among elites has fre-
quently been considered as indicating the existence of serious deficien-
eies in democratic representation. Conventional wisdom customarily 
assurnes that the prevailing barriers to social mobility also constitute 
effective barriers to the representation of working-class interests among 
the elite. This could imply an assumption that soeial class background 
determines political interests. However, there is abundant empirical 
evidence that family background is at best indirectly related to the 
political attitudes of elite members. That is, it determines which career 
a young person is Iikely to choose (Edinger and Searing, 1967; Sch1eth, 
1971), but political preferences, on the other hand, are to a much larger 
extent determined by the organizational environment in which a person 
actually works. 
It seems perfectly plausible that family background should be a much 
less relevant indicator of policy preferences than a person's present 
social status. In electoral studies, only the 1atter is normally considered 
as an important determinant of voting behavior, and the effect of the 
former is rarely discussed. The importance of this distinction is often 
concealed because of the high intercorrelation of family background 
and present soeial status. For elite research, this distinction is important 
because it implies that we must consider the question of elite represen-
tativeness (in social background terms) as separate from the question 
of how weil the elites represent the political beliefs and wishes of the 
citizens. 
Similarly, the professional training and early professional experience 
of elites have frequently been studied on the assumption that they 
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intluence not only the professional but also the political outlooks of 
elites. A prime illustration of this kind of research is Dahrendorf's 
discussion of the dominance oflawyers in the West German elite (1967: 
ch. 15). Lawyers do indeed still make up the single largest professional 
group (29.7 percent) among West German elites in 1981, eVen though 
their share has declined considerably. In a previous elite study in 1972, 
the proportion of lawyers was still nearly 10 percent higher, and Dah-
rendorf estimated that lawyers made up about half of the elite at the 
time he wrote bis book (1967: 222). 
However, any conclusions from these data are based on the assump-
tion that the study of law produces a homogeneity of outlooks that 
transcends later career experiences. This is what Dahrendorf's thesis is 
all about (1967: 231). He argues that German law as statutory law "is 
governed by an unbounded nostalgia for certainty" and lacks "confi-
dence in discussion and criticism" (1967: 229). He thus presumes that 
West German lawyers are predominantly conservative and dogmatic. 
This conclusion is no longer warranted, however, because the law 
faculties in West Germany have changed considerably in the aftermath 
of the educational reforms of the 1970s and also in response to Dah-
rendorf's unfavorable judgment. Younger West German lawyers are 
therefore not necessarily more conservative than university graduates 
in other fields (Hoff mann-Lange, 1985: 69-70). 
Moreover, even if the course of studies should indeed foster a com-
mon mentality among the graduates of law faculties, this obviously does 
not intluence the attitude that is most relevant for policymaking: party 
preference. In our 1981 elite survey, the party preferences ofrespondents 
with a law degree did not differ significantly from those of respondents 
with other professional training. And, because party preference is the 
single most important predictor of political issue attitudes, the lawyers 
in the elites are certainly not more homogeneous in their policy pref-
erences. 
The same pattern is probably true for other professional groups as 
weil. Unless professional training and later career are intimately re-
lated-as, for instance, in the military or in the media and cultural 
sectors-we cannot expect the former to have any significant effect on 
the political outlooks of the elites. 
The pronounced effect of the present positional environment on the 
political preferences of the elites can instead be clearly seen in the 
upper half of Table 4.4 that shows the party preferences of elites from 
different sectors. Business elites and militaryelites predominantly favor 
the Christian Democratic parties, and most labor leaders show a strong 
preference for the Social Democrats. In the other elite groups, a some-
what more balanced distribution of party preferences can be found. 
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TABLE 4.4 Party Preference of Nonpolitical Elltes and the General Population (row 
percentages, mlssing values exclUded) 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP 
ELiTES 
Civil service 35.4 43.4 21.3 
Business 10.0 75.7 14.2 
Business associations 2.6 79.6 17.8 
Trade unions 85.4 13.4 1.2 
Mass media 21.3 55.2 23.6 
Academic 21.7 54.3 23.9 
Military 3.0 84.8 12.1 
Cultural elltes 45.6 25.0 29.4 
Other 38.0 51.9 10.2 
Total 26.5 55.7 17.8 
WORK FORCE. 40 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER 
SY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS 
Large employers 7.4 88.9 3.7 
Small employers 9.6 84.6 5.9 
Self-employed, 
16.4 no employees 22.0 61.6 
Higher whlte-collar 37.5 51.6 10.9 
Lower whlte-collar 38.2 50.6 11.2 
Higher blue-collar 54.2 41.9 3.9 
Lower blue-collar 58.3 36.0 5.7 
Total 41.6 49.5 8.9 
Sources: Figures for the elltes are from Rudolf WIldenmann et al. , Fl1hrungsschlcht In 
der BundesrepublIk Deutschland 1981 (Mannhelm: Universitllt Mannhelm, 1982); data 
far the general population are from author's secondary analyses of a pooIed data-set 
of several represantative surveys carried out between 1976 and 1979 by ZU MA (Zentrum 
fUr Umfragen, Methoden, und Analysen), Mannhelm. 
This latter pattern may be the result of two entirely different processes. 
It may indicate that in some sectors political affiliation is not arelevant 
criterion for recruitment and careers. In sectors where political affiliation 
counts, however, counteracting political pressures may cancei each other 
out. The latter is, for instance, true for civil service and media elites 
in West Germany (Hoffmann-Lange, 1986).6 
The implication of the overall distribution of party preferences among 
the elites is rather obvious. It shows clearly that the major governing 
party in 1981, the SPD, had to operate in a social environment dom-
inated by other elites who would have preferred anational government 
led by the Christian Democrats. Moreover, this underrepresentation of 
the Social Democrats amongthe elites-compared to the population at 
large-was at best partly a result of a poor Social Democratic perfor-
mance in government. More likely, it is a relatively persistent charac-
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TABLE 4.5 Score Dlfferences Between CDU/CSU and SPD for the Four Most Con-
troverslal Polftieal Issues· 
Polltleal Other 
Elltes Elltes Population 
Private broadcastlng stations 
should be admitted as 
competltion to publfe stations 3.9 2.7 0.3 
The eomprehenslve sehool 
should become a regular 
school in addition to others 3.8 2.7 1.0 
The decree denylng aeeess 
of radiceis to the elvil 
service should be abolfshed 3.5 2.3 0.8 
The 1976 law on 
codetermination Is Insuffielent 
and should be extended 2.9 2.6 0.7 
·Polltical elltes by party; other elltes and population by party preference. Maximum 
scale difference: 5. 
Sourees: Flgures for elltes are from Rudolf Wildenmann et al., Fl1hrungssehleht in der 
BundesrepublIk Deutschland 1981 (Mannhelm: Unlversltlt Mannhelm, 1982), and a general 
population survey of 1982 that Ineluded a set of identlcal attitude questions (see Note 
7 at end of ehapter). 
teristic of West German elites. The percentages of elite respondents 
favoring the Social Democratic party over other political parties were 
only slightly higher in two earlier elite surveys done in 1968 and 1972 
(33.9 percent and 31.1 percent). 
The party preference of an individual not only indicates his or her 
basic political commitment, it also closely relates to the political issue 
attitudes of that individual. A comparison of the issue attitudes of 
elites and the general population7 shows elite attitudes to be considerably 
more polarized along party lines. This can be seen by comparing the 
differences of attitude scores between Social Democrats and Christian 
Democrats8 on a set of political issue statements that were rated ac-
cording to the degree to which the respondents agreed with them. The 
rating scale ranged from 1 to 6, meaning that the maximum difference 
was 5. The average score difference for eleven issue items is 2.2 for 
the political elites, 1.6 for the other elites, and 0.5 for the general 
population. It must be noted, though, that the differences in a11 three 
groups are consistent, that is, they go into the same direction. The four 
most controversial issues produced the results shown in Table 4.5. 
From similar results in the United States, Herbert McClosky et al. 
(1960) have concluded that it would be more appropriate to reverse the 
question of representation. Instead of asking how weIl the elites rep-
resent the issue attitudes of their followers, we should ask how respon-
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sive citizens are to the issue conflicts that exist among the elites. Recent 
time-series analyses have empirically confirmed the presumption that 
political issue conflicts normally arise first at the elite level and affect 
the attitudes of ordinary citizens only after a political dispute at the 
elite level has been going on for some time (Carmines and Stimson, 
1986). 
In addition to this result of a greater polarization of political attitudes 
at the elite level, which turns the question of representation upside 
down, persistent differences exist between the policy preferences of 
elites and citizens that are not related to party preference at all. They 
derive from the different political role definitions of elites and citizens. 
Citizens are consumers of policies; elites are policymakers. As con-
sumers, citizens assign high salience to policy goals they consider 
relevant to their lives, and whether these goals are compatible is not 
their primary concern. This means that they may attribute a similarly 
high priority to incompatible goals. A frequently cited example of this 
tendency is the fact that citizens may simultaneously advocate lower 
taxes and higher welf are benefits. But elites cannot ignore the incom-
patibility of different policies because they are the ones who must make 
priority decisions. The elites, therefore, tend to emphasize the inverse 
relationship between tax reductions and welf are benefits, some recent 
counterexamples notwithstanding. 
This difference in role definitions is evident in the political attitudes 
of elites and citizens. Table 4.6 shows the policy preferences of both 
groups on two different attitude questions. The upper part of the table 
provides the results for two issues that had to be rated independently. 
Although more than half of the respondents in the population rated 
these two goals as equally important, nearly 80 percent of the elites 
assigned a clear priority to only one of the two. 
The lower half of the table shows what happens when the respondents 
are explicitly asked to assign a priority to two conflicting policy goals. 
The respondents in the population are divided into two equally strong 
groups, with only slight differences between the supporters of the 
different parties. Among the political elites, we can instead detect the 
same clear-cut partisan pattern that was already present in the inde-
pendent ratings. I do not want to assert that the citizens answered 
randomly, but it is apparent from these results that citizen priorities 
are not consistently related to party preferences; therefore, they dc not 
give any clear indication to the parties as to what policies to pursue. 
Instead, they impart a good deal of discretion to the elites. These 
results contradict the thesis of a government overload in Western de-
mocracies resulting from an "inflation of demands" on the political 
system by ordinary citizens. 
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TA8LE 4.6 Political Prlorltles 01 POlltlcal Elltes and the General Population (column 
parcentages, misslng values axcluded) 
Polltlcal Elltes Population" 
CDU/ CDU/ 
SPD CSU FDP Total SPD CSU FDP Total 
1. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF "REDUCTION OF THE PUBUC OEBT" AND "FUll EMP!.OYMENT" 
Reductlon 01 
publlc debt more 
Important 0.6 43.1 2.0 24.6 16.9 20.1 15.1 18.5 
80th equally 
Important 9.8 33.3 12.0 20.7 50.4 61.4 54.2 54.4 
Full employment 
more Important 89.3 23.6 36.0 54.4 32.7 18.5 30.7 27.1 
2. "G/VEN THE PRESENT S/ZE OF THE PUBUC DEBT. A REDUCT/ON OF SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS SHOULD 
BE CONSIDERED" 
Approve 
Disapprove 
17.9 79.0 76.0 51.1 
82.1 21.0 24.0 48.9 
°Total population, 16 years and over. 
46.9 58.1 47.4 50.0 
53.1 41.9 52.6 50.0 
Sourees: Figures lor elltes are Irom Rudoll WIldenmann et al., Fl1hrungsschicht In der 
BundesrepublIk Deutschland 1981 (Mannhelm: UnlversltAt Mannheim, 1982), and a general 
population survey of 1982 that Included a set of identlcal attitude questions (see Note 
7 at end 01 chapter). 
I have argued (1) that the political attitudes of the elites are not 
related to their social class background, and (2) that they ditfer system-
atically from those of ordinary citizens. This justifies the conclusion 
that elite roles automatically lead to a certain independence of elite 
political attitudes from social structural determination. In this vein, 
Robert Putnam has argued that even elites selected at random would 
develop policy preferences distinct from those of the citizens (1976: 
142). 
It is equally important to note, however, that these ditferences have 
a certain social bias. That is, they are not independent of the social 
position of the elites. We have already seen that the party preferences 
of the elites are closely related to their attitudes toward specific policies. 
These party preferences are in turn highly skewed in favor of the 
middle-class parties-the CDU /CSU and FDP. Because voting behavior 
in West Germany is still to a large extent determined by social structural 
factors, we can conceive of the party preferences of voter groups as a 
kind of generalized mandate given to a party for pursuing policies on 
behalf of the interests of that social group. Thus, the SPD is expected 
to pursue working-c1ass interests, and the CDU/CSU and FDP are 
generally considered as favoring middle-class and business interests. 
This means that working-class interests are seriously underrepresented 
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among the elites because the trade union elite is the only group in 
which the Social Democrats enjoy majority support. 
This political bias is presumably due to the fact that the career elites 
constitute the top stratum of the middle e1ass, having risen to their 
present positions through long careers in organizations representing 
middle-class values and interests. Such a conelusion is confirmed by 
the figures in the bottom half of Table 4.4, which show that among 
West German voters the SPD share deelines with rising occupational 
status. Radical critics thus make a valid point in e1aiming that elites 
primarily represent the interests of the upper strata in society. This is 
counteracted by the public's electoral power, though, which can and 
does bring parties representing lower-class interests into positions of 
political power. 
Summing up the evidence favoring the radical paradigm, we can 
conelude that the radical critics have drawn attention to the problem 
of elite responsiveness and popular control of elites. The empirical 
results show that there may not be much to respond to after all because 
ordinary citizens do not have the kind of well-developed policy pref-
erences that characterize elite respondents. On the other hand, the 
results also show that elites differ in their social composition, as weIl 
as in their party preferences, from the population at large. Both results 
can only partly be explained by their elite status; rather, they are related 
to the social position of the elites, i.e., they reflect the elites' high social 
status. Furthermore, the results do not confirm another fundamf''ltal 
assertion of radical social scientists, which is that a dichotomy exists 
between elites and nonelites. Elites differ only in degree from other 
upper-middle-class members of society. 
Although I do not have comparative data to test whether this con-
e1usion holds true for modern democracies· in general, it seems rather 
likely that it would. In all modern societies, we find unequal oppor-
tunities for social mobility and therefore a skewed distribution in the 
social backgrounds of elites. Similarly, in all democracies occupational 
status is a major determinant of voting behavior. We can thus expect 
elites as the top stratum of the upper middle e1ass to have more 
conservative party preferences than the population at large. 
Elite Integration in West Germany 
Having analyzed the results that contribute to answering the question 
of vertical integration in West German society, it is appropriate to 
direct attention to the aspect of horizontal integration as weIl. This is 
the aspect that both pluralists and Dahrendorf have considered as 
crucial to modern· democracies. 
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Dahrendorf's theory of elites rests on the assumption that social 
cohesion is a necessary precondition of elite integration. In his opinion, 
this facilitates the existence of an elite that is liberal and effective at 
the same time. Dut how should this social cohesion be measured? One 
indicator would be that the elites are drawn from a small stratum in 
society and thus have similar social backgrounds. We have seen that 
this is not true for the West German elites and probably does not hold 
true for any industrialized society. 
Because Dahrendorf acknowledges the incompatibility of liberal de-
mocracy with the monopoly of a socially homogeneous elite and ad-
vocates equality of opportunities, he looks for other factors that could 
foster elite integration. Drawing on the Anglo-Saxon experience, he 
argues that the institutions of elite socialization may provide a good 
basis for this. For example, the existence of a small number of insti-
tutions of higher education in which future elites would be socialized 
into a common value system and develop an esprit de corps would 
enable them to cooperate easily in later years. In Dahrendorf's view, 
a system of exc1usive private schools and elite universities therefore 
provides an ideal breeding ground for future elites. West Germany, 
where such institutions do not exist, thus lacks the structure for such 
focused socialization. 
Dahrendorf also discusses another means of elite integration that 
could compensate for a lack of homogeneous preadult socialization of 
elites. This is a professional socialization, which requires future elites 
to acquire broad occupational experiences. The underlying assumption 
is that such experiences foster the development of general managerial 
skills among elites as opposed to specialized knowledge that character-
izes the subelites. Such a variegated career pattern gives future elites 
ftrsthand experience in a variety of organizational contexts and at the 
same time enhances elite integration by bringing them into contact 
with one another. It must be noted, though, that in contrast to Dah-
rendorf, who views such a pattern as beneficial, C. Wright Mills focuses 
on its inherent dangers. In MiIIs's opinion, it contributes to a homo-
geneity of interests among the elites that distinguishes them in disad-
vantageous ways from the rest of society (1956: 287-288). 
The dominant U.S. career pattern of free and frequent movement 
between sectors can thus be considered as conducive to elite integration. 
West German elites, in contrast, normally pursue much more specialized 
careers than is true for their U.S. counterparts. Except in the political 
sphere, elite careers are built predominantly within one sector (see 
Hoffinann-Lange, 1985: 70-74). Doth Dahrendorf and Erwin Scheuch 
(1966) have considered this emphasis on expertise (as opposed to broad 
professional experience) to be problematic. They have claimed that it 
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contributes to an overreliance on seemingly "objective" solutions rather 
than admitting open contests between conflicting interests. It creates 
respected "spheres of influence" for the different groups of experts who 
protect exclusive decisionmaking power in their own field while at the 
same time refraining from mingling in other decisionmaking arenas. 
On the basis of this evidence of heterogeneous social backgrounds 
and specialized career patterns, Dahrendorf concluded that West Ger-
man elites form a "cartel of anxiety" rather than a self-confident, liberal 
elite. This conclusion c1early contradicts the presumption of radical 
sociologists that power elites dominate decisionmaking in Western de-
mocracies. Power elitists argue instead that the common interest of 
elites in preserving their privileged status is the only relevant factor 
governing elite behavior. "Elites are power elites because they wield 
the power to assert their point of view and not because they carve 
meat the same way, read the same books, and applaud to the same 
theater performances." (Jaeggi, 1969: 24) In this view, elite integration 
results from the requirements of elite positions and develops automat-
ically, thus rendering a common elite culture expendable. 
As so often happens, the truth may lie somewhere between these 
two opposing positions. Although, by virtue of their position, elites 
must interact with one another to protect the interests of their orga-
nizations, personal acquaintance and well-established informal norms 
governing interorganizational bargaining are certainly instrumental for 
a smooth functioning of the decisionmaking process. Dahrendorf tends 
to overlook, however, the fact that homogeneity of socialization, broad 
professional experience, and long-term personal acquaintance are not 
the only ways to achieve this. Instead, we can safely assume that norms 
of interaction with representatives of other organizations belong to the 
repertory of skills customarily learned on the job and that they are 
sufficient to produce good working relations among elites of different 
organizations and sectors. This is true even where socialization is 
specialized and does not involve personal working experience in other 
sectors. 
Moreover, the mechanisms Dahrendorf cherishes so much may even 
be dysfunctional because they may produce a collusion of personal 
interests among the representatives of different organizations. That, in 
turn, may interfere with the requirements of their positions, which are 
designed to protect the interests of their organizations. It is not by 
chance that critical sociologists have based their contention that modern 
democracies are governed by power elites on precisely these mecha-
nisms, which in their eyes undermine the loyalty of the elites to their 
own organizations. 
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TABLE 4.7 Ssctor ComposItIon 01 Central Elite Clrcles In West Germany, the United 
States, and Australla (column parcentages) 
West Unlted 
Germeny Stetes Australia 
POlltics 37.6 50.2 27.2 
ClvIl service 9.4 5.7 18.4 
Business' 25.3 16.3 20.8 
Trade unions 9.7 7.0 8.9 
Mass media 10.0 7.5 8.1 
Academic 5.6 7.5 9.8 
Other 2.4 5.7 6.7 
Total (n) 340 227 418 
• Business and business assoclatlons comblned. 
Sources: Flgures for West Germany are from Rudolf Wilden mann et al., FOhrungsschlcht 
In der Bundesrepub/lk Deutschland 1981 (Mannhelm: Unlversltlt Mannhelm, 1982); figures 
for the Unlted States and Australla are from John Higley and Gwen Moore, "Elite 
Integration In the Unlted States and Australla," Amerlcan PoIltlcal Sc/ence Review 75 
(1981), pp. 581-597. 
Our data provide evidence that the degree of elite integration in 
West Germany in the early 1980s was not 10wer than that found in 
Western democracies with a much longer democratic tradition. A com-
parative study of elite networks in the United States, Australia, and 
West Germany shows similar degrees of elite integration in all three of 
these countries, indicating that Dahrendorf's concerns were largely 
unfounded. Even though a formal position of power is the most im-
portant precondition for achieving prominent status in an elite network, 
this network is based on informal contacts with other decisionmakers. 
We can therefore conclude that although formal rules provide the 
underlying structure in which elite interactions take place, they are 
everywhere complemented by informal rules of the game that are a 
precondition for effective decisionmaking and that develop automatically 
in a stable environment. 
The results of analyses of elite networks in the three countries are 
presented in Table 4.7. The analyses were based on nominations that 
elite respondents made of interaction partners during the interview. In 
all three studies, respondents were first asked to indicate the one national 
issue on which they had been most active during the recent months. 
They were subsequently encouraged to name their most important 
interaction partners for that issue. Within the larger network of elite 
interactions based on these nominations, the analysis program then 
searched for elite circles characterized by relatively high cohesion, Le., 
linked by short paths that involved only few intermediaries. In each 
country, the analysis revealed the existence of a fairly compact elite 
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circle made up of a few hundred political influentials.9 The results in 
Table 4.7 clearly show the importance of the political-administrative 
sectors, indicating that these sectors perform a crucial function in elite 
integration. 
More extensive analyses of the U.S. elite network showed the contacts 
among the elites to be based on instrumental considerations rather than 
social closeness. Persons with similar social backgrounds did not interact 
more frequently (Moore and Alba, 1982). This is another indication 
that Dahrendorf's elite theory may be based on the false assumption 
that social cohesion is a universal requirement for elite integration. 
Anthony Giddens (1979: 147) has instead treated these two variables 
as independent and developed an elite typology that differs from Dah-
rendorf's. His is based on a cross-classification of the two factors 
"openness of elite recruitment" and "elite integration." Elites with open 
recruitment yet a high degree of integration are designated as "solidary 
elites" or "power elites." It is important to note, however, that Giddens's 
definition of a power elite lacks the implications associated with this 
concept by C. Wright Mills. Giddens only assumes that a high degree 
of elite integration also implies a high degree of power concentration 
and thus leads to an oligarchie mode of decisionmaking. 
To sum up the foregoing discussion with respect to the pluralist 
paradigrn, the conclusion seems justified that the importance of social 
homogeneity and broad professional socialization for elite integration 
has often been overrated. Social cohesion can also develop among 
socially heterogeneous and specialized elites. My results support the 
conclusion that the West German elite today can be characterized as 
an "established" elite in Dahrendorf's sense. 
Nevertheless, Dahrendorf was probably not so far from the truth 
with his contention that the West German elite in the 1950s could 
rightfully be characterized as a "cartel of anxiety." He attributed this 
to the lack of social homogeneity of the elites, but instead it seems 
more plausible to assume that it was due to the lack of experience with 
democratic institutions-a lack of informal rules governing elite inter-
actions. 
Both in the Weimar Republic and in the early years of the Federal 
Republic, German elites were suddenly confronted with a set of new 
political institutions. The new constitutions defined the formal rules of 
political decisionmaking. Such formal rules are not sufficient, however, 
to make a politica1 system work smoothly. They provide only a frame-
work that has to be fiUed with life. Therefore, the elite actors must 
develop informal rules of interaction to achieve that. In such a situation, 
two different reactions are conceivable. The actors may decide to assert 
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their interests in a conflictual way, trying to extract as much profit as 
possible from an unstructured situation, or they may act defensively, 
attempting to grant everyone his or her fair share of power. 
This is precisely where the two German democracies differ. The 
conservative elites of the Weimar Republic chose the first path. They 
ruthlesslyasserted their reactionary goals and tried to reestablish their 
traditional dominance. In the early years of the Federal Republic, on 
the other hand, all of the elites decided to follow the second strategy. 
The legitimacy as well as the effective power of the traditionally anti-
democratic elites were now shattered, and the democratic elites feit 
morally justified to claim their share of power and also enjoyed the 
support of the Allied occupying forces. Given the complete failure of 
traditional German politics, all elite groups were eager to overcome the 
historical experience and to make the democratic institutions work this 
time. Defensive rather than assertive behavior became the predominant 
norm. Gordon Smith, who analyzed this behavior, concluded that West 
German elites long showed a tendency to cling rigidly to the newly 
found political consensus and to avoid open conflict. He argued that 
the pressures toward political conformity were considerable, which in 
turn led to a paradox: "the liberal state lacking in the liberal spirit" 
(1986: 229). 
Finally, the striking similarity of Dahrendorf's "cartel of anxiety" 
to the concept of consociational democracy should be noted. Dahrendorf 
even explicitly refers to the similarity of the West German elite structure 
with the sociopolitical "pillarization" in the Netherlands, which is 
normally considered as one of the prime examples of consociationalism 
(1967: 262). Although other authors have claimed that consociationalism 
is the only method to achieve democratic stability in fragmented so-
cieties, Dahrendorf emphasizes instead the negative aspects of the 
consociational model of power-sharing: stagnation and a lack of inno-
vation. His ideal type of democracy is the more conflictual Westminster 
model (cf. Lijphart, 1984). When we conceive of these two models as 
the endpoints of a continuum ranging from consensual to conflictual 
politics, West Germany is normally located in the middle. But it is 
entirely plausible to assume that the degree of consensual politics was 
much higher in the early years of the Federal Republic and that only 
later did a development similar to that in the Netherlands take place, 
where consociationalism gradually gave way to competitive politics 
(Steiner, 1986: 204). It can be assumed that only the high degree of 
stability achieved by the 19605 made such a change possible (cf. Smith, 
1986: 232-235). 
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Conclusion 
The empirical evidence on West German elites in the 19805 shows 
them to be fairly similar to those of other Western democracies_ The 
prevailing recruitment patterns for elite positions in all of these coun-
tries tend to favor persons from privileged backgrounds. This is not 
due to any elite conspiracy, however, that would deliberately bar the 
off spring of the working class from rising to the top. Rather, it is the 
result of a persistent association between sodal class background and 
educational opportunities; at the same time, higher education is an 
essential precondition for professional advancement. Socially, the elites 
therefore constitute the top stratum of the upper middle class, some-
thing that is also apparent in their predominantly conservative political 
party preferences. Thus, radical social scientists have rightfully con-
cluded that elites represent middle-class interests rather than working-
class interests. 
On the other hand, comparisons of the issue attitudes of elites and 
citizens do not support the notion that elite preferences systematically 
misrepresent the preferences of the populace. Instead, elite attitudes 
tend to span a broader spectrum of opinions and reflect a higher degree 
of attitudinal consistency, which stems partly from their higher edu-
cational level and partly from the elite role that forces them to pay 
close attention to political issues and the contingencies among them. 
Lastly, the data indicate that the degree of elite integration in West 
Germany is not lower than that in other Western democracies that can 
look back to a much longer and uninterrupted democratic history, such 
as, the United States and Australia. Although it is quite conceivable 
that elite integration was relatively low in the early years of the Federal 
Republic, Dahrendorf was wrong in attributing this to the lack of 
institutions of elite socialization and specialized career patterns in West 
Germany. Rather, German society up to 1945 and also West Germany 
until the 1960s lacked an elite culture supportive of a competitive 
democracy, that is, a political culture combining conflict over issues 
with a consensus on the democratic roles of the game and a mutual 
acceptance of the legitimacy among a broad spectrum of political and 
socioeconomic actors. My study is but one piece of evidence for the 
profound changes that have taken place in West Germany since the 
1950s. It is consistent with studies on other aspects of West German 
society confirming that the fundamental rupture of 1945 provided the 
basis for a democratic development in West Germany that took some 
time to take root. Elites that started out defensively and primarily tried 
to protect the interests of their own organizations have increasingly 
learned to cooperate with one another in ways that today combine 
West German Elites 101 
fairly high levels of conflict with a basic commitment to the protection 
of the existing democratic structures. 
Notes 
I. Elites also play an important role in the theory of consociational democ-
racy, which attempts to explain how democratic institutions can function in 
subculturally segmented, "plural" societies. "Plural societies may enjoy stable 
democratic government if the politica1 leaders engage in coalescent rather than 
adversarial decision-making." (Lijphart, 1977: 100). Tbe political culture of the 
Weimar Republic has customarily been characterized as fragmented (Lijphart, 
1977: 117), thereby implying that the breakdown of democracy in Germany 
was at least partly caused by a failure of the Gerrnan (politica1) elites to engage 
in coalescent decisionmaking. 
2. This elite survey was the core part of a research project on "Elites in 
the Federal Republic of Gerrnany 1981" conducted at the University of Mann-
heim in the early 19805. It included personal interviews with 1,744 incumbents 
of leadership positions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Tbe project was 
made possible by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Principal 
investigators were Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase, and the author. For further 
information on this study, see Hoffmann-Lange, 1987. 
3. Dahrendorf hirnself uses the term "political attitude." 
4. All data are interview data, and the ftgures are therefore not as reliable 
as census data. Nevertheless, the population data do not deviate too much 
from the actual distribution of the four variables in the West German popu-
lation. They come from a pooled data set of nine general population surveys 
carried out between 1976 and 1979 by the Zentrum rur Umfragen Methoden 
und Analysen (ZUMA), Mannheim. Tbe pooling of different surveys has the 
advantage of providing a much larger number of respondents. This is partie-
ularly relevant when the research focus is on specific subgroups that in standard 
cross-sectional surveys are only represented by a very small number of cases, 
e.g., college graduates. 
5. For the civil service elite, see Steinkernper, 1974. 
6. It is weil known that the political parties compete for political influence 
on the recruitment of leadership personnel in the civil service and in the public 
broadcasting media. This may lead to a quota that allows each of the established 
parties to recruit a certain number of leaders from its own followers (Porporz), 
which is the pattern typica1ly found in public broadcasting. In the civil service, 
on the other hand, the governing party /parties have the exclusive right to 
appoint and dismiss personnel of the highest ranks (the so-called "political 
civil servants"), and they will usua1ly only appoint their own loyalists. However, 
because the politica1 parties have their politica1 strongholds in different parts 
of the country, the state administrations are controlled by different parties, thus 
leading to an overall balanced distribution of party preferences in the civil 
service elite. Finally, in the private print media newspapers and periodicals 
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with different political outlooks recruit their own personnel according to the 
political preferences of their owners. 
7. The population data in Table 4.5 come from a general population survey 
of early 1982 that included identical attitude questions. This was part of the 
research project on "Elites in the Federal Republic of Germany 1981" and was 
supported by an additional grant from the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. 
8. This includes party members in the political elites. In the other elites 
and in the general population, party preference was taken instead. 
9. More detailed reports on these studies can be found in Higley et al., 
1979; Higiey and Moore, 1981; Hoffmann-Lange, 1989. 
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